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ABSTRACT
Users often wish to participate in online groups anonymously,
but misbehaving users may abuse this anonymity to spam or
disrupt the group. Messaging protocols such as Mix-nets and
DC-nets leave online groups vulnerable to denial-of-service
and Sybil attacks, while accountable voting protocols are
unusable or inefficient for general anonymous messaging.
We present the first general messaging protocol that offers
provable anonymity with accountability for moderate-size
groups, and efficiently handles unbalanced loads where few
members have much data to transmit in a given round. The
N group members first cooperatively shuffle an N ×N ma-
trix of pseudorandom seeds, then use these seeds in N “pre-
planned” DC-nets protocol runs. Each DC-nets run trans-
mits the variable-length bulk data comprising one member’s
message, using the minimum number of bits required for
anonymity under our attack model. The protocol preserves
message integrity and one-to-one correspondence between
members and messages, makes denial-of-service attacks by
members traceable to the culprit, and efficiently handles
large and unbalanced message loads. A working prototype
demonstrates the protocol’s practicality for anonymous mes-
saging in groups of 40+ member nodes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Anonymous participation is often considered a basic right
in free societies [39]. The limited form of anonymity the
that Internet provides is a widely cherished feature [33, 37]
that enables people and groups with controversial or un-
popular views to communicate and organize without fear of
personal reprisal [30]. In spite of its benefits, anonymity
makes it difficult to trace or exclude misbehaving partici-
pants [10]. Online protocols providing stronger anonymity,
such as mix-networks [7, 18] and DC-nets [8, 28, 36] further
weaken accountability and yield forums in which no content
may be considered trustworthy and no defense is available
against anonymous misbehavior.
This paper focuses on providing anonymous messaging
within small, private online groups. We assume a group’s
membership is closed and known to its members; creating
groups with secret membership is a related but orthogonal
goal [34]. Members may wish to send messages to each other,
to the whole group, or to a non-member, such that the re-
ceiver knows that some member sent the message but no
one knows which member. Members may also wish to
cast secret ballots in votes held by the group, or to create
pseudonyms under which to collaborate with other members.
We also wish to hold members accountable, however: not
by compromising their anonymity and allowing some author-
ity or majority quorum to unmask a member whose messages
prove unpopular, but rather by ensuring that no malicious
member can abuse his (strong) anonymity to disrupt the
group’s operation. For example, a malicious member should
be unable to corrupt or block other members’ messages,
overrun the group with spam, stuff ballots, or create un-
limited anonymous Sybil identities [14] or sock puppets [32]
with which to bias or subvert the group’s deliberations.
As a motivating example, suppose an international group
of journalists wishes to form a “whistleblowing” publication
like WikiLeaks [38]. To protect journalists and their sources
more strongly than the world’s varied legal frameworks do,
member journalists wish to submit leaked documents and re-
lated information to the group anonymously. Members need
assurance that powerful organizations or governments can-
not trace the leak to an individual journalist or her source.
The journalists wish to prove to their readers that leaked
documents come via a trustworthy channel, namely one of
the group’s known and reputable members, and not from
an outsider. The group must be able to analyze and vet
each document thoroughly before collectively approving it
for publication. The group must protect its internal opera-
tion and its members’ anonymity even from adversaries who
have planted colluding spies within the group. And this se-
curity must come at acceptable time and resource costs.
We present an accountable anonymous messaging pro-
tocol called Dissent (Dining-cryptographers Shuffled-Send
Network), the first we know of with the properties needed
in scenarios like the one above. Dissent provides provable
integrity, anonymity, and accountability in the face of strong
traffic analysis and compromised members, and an experi-
mental prototype shows it to be efficient enough for latency-
tolerant messaging in small but widely distributed groups.
In contrast with mix-networks [7, 18] and DC-nets [8, 28,
36], Dissent implements a shuffled send primitive, where
each group member sends exactly one message per round,
making it usable for voting or assigning pseudonyms with a
1-to-1 correspondence to real group members. Unlike verifi-
able cryptographic shuffles [17,22], Dissent uses only readily-
available cryptographic primitives, and handles arbitrary-
size messages and unbalanced loads efficiently, such as when
one journalist has a multi-gigabyte document to leak at a
time when the others have nothing to send.
Dissent operates in two stages, shuffle and bulk trans-
fer. The shuffle protocol builds on a data mining protocol
by Brickell and Shmatikov [5] to permute a set of fixed-
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length messages, one from each group member, and broad-
cast the set to all members with cryptographically strong
anonymity. Like many anonymous messaging protocols, the
original data mining protocol was vulnerable to untraceable
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by malicious members. Our
refinements remove this vulnerability by adding go/no-go
and blame phases, which can trace and hold accountable
any group member maliciously disrupting the protocol.
Dissent’s bulk protocol builds on the information-theoretic
anonymity of DC-nets [8,28,36], but leverages Dissent’s shuf-
fle protocol to replace the DoS-prone slot reservation sys-
tems in prior DC-nets schemes with a prearranged transmis-
sion schedule guaranteeing each member exactly one mes-
sage slot per round. In each round, all group members
broadcast bit streams based on pseudorandom seeds dis-
tributed via the shuffle protocol, so that XORing all mem-
bers’ bit streams together yields a permuted concatenation
of all members’ variable-length messages. Cryptographic
hashes distributed in the shuffle phase enable members to
verify the correctness of each others’ bulk transmissions, en-
suring message integrity and DoS protection throughout.
Dissent has limitations, of course. It is not intended for
large-scale, “open-access” anonymous messaging or file shar-
ing [9, 18], although it might serve as a building block in
designs like Herbivore [28]. Dissent’s accountability prop-
erties assume closed groups, and are ineffective if a mali-
cious member can just leave and rejoin the group under a
new (public) identity after expulsion. Dissent is also not
a general-purpose voting system, providing only a limited
form of coercion resistance for example. The serialized shuf-
fle protocol imposes a per-round startup delay that makes
Dissent impractical for latency-sensitive applications.
We built a working prototype of Dissent, and tested it
under Emulab [15] on groups of up to 44 nodes connected
via simulated wide-area links. Anonymously distributing
messages up to 16MB in size among 16 nodes with 100ms
inter-node delays, Dissent’s shuffle and other startup costs
incur a 1.4-minute latency, but it handles large message
loads, both balanced and unbalanced, in about 3.5× the
time required for non-anonymized group messaging via TCP.
Varying group size, Dissent can send a 1MB message anony-
mously in less than 1 minute in a 4-member group, 4 minutes
for a 20-node group, and 14 minutes for a 40-node group.
While not suitable for interactive workloads, therefore, Dis-
sent should be usable for “WikiLeaks”-type scenarios requir-
ing strong security guarantees in small decentralized groups.
This paper makes four main technical contributions. First,
we enhance Brickell/Shmatikov’s shuffle protocol [5] to make
DoS attackers traceable without compromising anonymity.
Second, we use this shuffle protocol to create a DoS-resistant
DC-nets variant for bulk transfer, which guarantees each
member exactly one transmission slot per round. Third, we
introduce the first shuffle protocol that supports arbitrary-
size and unbalanced message loads efficiently, e.g., when
only one member has data to send. Fourth, we demonstrate
through a working prototype the practicality of the protocol,
at least for delay-tolerant applications.
Section 2 provides an overview of Dissent’s communication
model, security goals, and operation. Section 3 formally de-
scribes the shuffle protocol, and Section 4 details the bulk
protocol. Section 5 informally covers practical implemen-
tation and usage considerations such as protocol initiation,
coercion resistance, and liveness. Section 6 describes our
prototype implementation and experimental results. Sec-
tion 7 summarizes related work, and Section 8 concludes.
2. PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
This section first introduces the group communication model
our protocol implements, outlines a few applications of this
model, and defines the protocol’s precise security goals, leav-
ing protocol details to subsequent sections.
2.1 The Shuffled Send Primitive
The purpose of Dissent is to provide a shuffled send com-
munication primitive, providing sender anonymity among
a well-defined group of nodes. We assume that the set of
members comprising the group, and each member’s public
key or certificate, is agreed upon and known to all group
members. The group may initiate a run of the shuffled send
protocol in any way that preserves anonymity goals: e.g.,
a designated leader, or every group member, might initiate
runs periodically, or a “client” in or outside the group not
requiring anonymity might initiate a run to request a ser-
vice provided by the group collectively. (A member’s desire
to send anonymously must not be the initiation event, if
traffic analysis protection is desired.) Each protocol run is
independent and permits each group member to send ex-
actly one variable-length message to some target designated
for that run; ongoing interaction requires multiple protocol
runs. A run’s target may be a particular group member, all
members (for anonymous group multicast), or another node
such as a non-member “client” that initiated the run.
Each protocol run operates as shown in Figure 1. Every
group member i secretly creates a message mi and submits
it to the protocol. The protocol collects all N secret mes-
sages, shuffles their order according to some random permu-
tation π that no one knows, concatenates the messages in
this shuffled order so that mi appears at position πi, and
sends the concatenated sequence of messages to the target.
Each input message mi can have a different length Li, and
the protocol’s output has length
∑
i
Li.
2.2 Applications of Shuffled Send
The shuffled send model combines and generalizes the
functionality of several classes of anonymity protocols. Al-
though every participant must submit a message in a given
protocol run, members with nothing to send can submit a
message of length zero, providing efficient single-sender as
well as multiple-sender service. (The protocol still causes
each member to send a similar number of bits on the underly-
ing network for traffic analysis protection, but none of these
bits are wasted padding messages of unbalanced lengths.)
Members wishing receiver anonymity can first anonymously
send a public encryption key to establish a pseudonym, then
look for messages encrypted with that key in subsequent
shuffled sends targeted at the whole group.
Since each member may submit exactly one message per
shuffled send, one run’s messages can serve as ballots in an
anonymous vote. Unlike anonymous voting protocols de-
signed for specific types of ballots and tallying methods,
Dissent supports ballots of arbitrary type, format, and size,
and group members can count and independently verify the
ballots in any agreed-upon fashion. Ballots need not be one-
shot messages either: a group can use one protocol run to
establish a set of pseudonymous signing keys, exactly one
per member, then use these pseudonyms in subsequent pro-
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Figure 1: Shuffled send communication model
tocol runs for pseudonymous deliberation, without permit-
ting members to create unlimited pseudonyms for Sybil at-
tacks [14] or sock puppetry [32].
Applications for which shuffled send may be suited include
whistleblowing [38], surveys [5], file sharing [28], accountable
Wiki-style editing [32], and “cocaine auctions” [29]. The
current version of Dissent also has limitations: e.g., it may
not scale to large groups, it provides only a limited form of
coercion resistance described in Section 5.3, and the latency
of the shuffle required on each protocol run may make the
protocol impractical for interactive or real-time messaging.
Future work may be able to address these limitations.
2.3 Security Goals
We now precisely define Dissent’s attack model and se-
curity goals. We assume the attacker is polynomial-time
limited, but can monitor all network traffic and compro-
mise any subset of group members. A member is honest
if she follows the protocol exactly and is not under the at-
tacker’s control, and faulty otherwise. Faulty nodes may col-
lude and send arbitrary messages. For simplicity, our core
protocol descriptions in Sections 3 and 4 assume that nodes
never just go silent; we address liveness using principles from
PeerReview [19] as outlined in Section 5. The formal secu-
rity properties we wish the protocol to satisfy are integrity,
anonymity, and accountability, as we define below.
• Integrity: The protocol maintains integrity if at the end
of a protocol run, every honest member either: (a) obtains
exactly N messages, including exactly one submitted by
each honest member, or (b) knows that the protocol did
not complete successfully.
• Anonymity: Following Brickell and Shmatikov [5], the
protocol maintains anonymity if a group of k ≤ N − 2
colluding members cannot match an honest participant’s
message to its author with a probability significantly bet-
ter than random guessing. (If all but one member col-
ludes, no anonymity is possible.)
• Accountability: Adopting ideas from PeerReview [19],
a member i exposes a member j if i holds third-party ver-
ifiable proof of j’s misbehavior. The protocol maintains
accountability if no member ever exposes an honest mem-
ber, and after a run, either: (a) each honest member suc-
cessfully obtains every honest member’s message, or (b)
all honest members expose at least one faulty member.
2.4 Protocol Operation Summary
Dissent consists of two sub-protocols: a shuffle protocol
and a bulk protocol, whose operation we briefly summarize
here to provide context for the detailed descriptions in the
next sections.
In the shuffle protocol, all members 1, . . . , N first choose
secret messages m1, . . . ,mN , of equal length L. Each mem-
ber i now iteratively wraps its message mi in 2N layers of
public-key encryption using an IND-CCA2 [2] secure algo-
rithm. Member i first encrypts mi using a list of tempo-
rary secondary public keys zj , one for each member j, in
reverse order zN , . . . , z1, to yield an intermediate cipherext
C′i. Member i then encrypts C
′
i further using a list of pri-
mary public keys yN , . . . , y1 to form a final ciphertext Ci.
Member 1 collects all final ciphertexts into one list, then
each member i in turn takes this list, strips off one layer
of encryption using his primary private key xi, randomly
shuffles the list, and passes the result to mi+1. Member
N broadcasts the final shuffled list to all members, each of
whom verifies that the list includes her own intermediate ci-
phertext C′i, and broadcasts a go if so and a no-go otherwise.
Each member i, upon receiving a go from all members,
broadcasts her secondary private key wi associated with zi,
enabling all members to decrypt the shuffled messages. On
receiving a no-go from any member, however, member i de-
stroys her private key wi and enters a blame phase, where
all members reveal the secrets used to encrypt the interme-
diate ciphertexts. Our shuffle protocol ensures integrity and
anonymity exactly as in its precursor [5], but our new go/no-
go and blame phases enable all group members to trace the
culprit of any protocol malfunction.
The shuffle protocol has two practical limitations: all mes-
sages must be of equal length L, incurring O(NL) extra
communication if only one member wishes to send; and its
decrypt-and-shuffle phase is inherently serial, incurring a
long delay if N or L is large. We currently have no solution
if N is large, but our bulk protocol addresses the problem of
sending large, variable-length messages efficiently.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the bulk protocol uses the shuf-
fle protocol to shuffle a set of N message descriptors, one
submitted anonymously by one member, instead of shuffling
the messages themselves. Each descriptor di contains the
length Li of member i’s message mi, a cryptographic hash
of mi, a vector ~Si of N seeds sij , each seed encrypted with
j’s primary public key and assigning j a pseudo-random bulk
ciphertext to transmit, and a vector ~Hi of hashes Hij vali-
dating each bulk ciphertext.
Member i “assigns himself” a junk seed sii and a hash Hii
of a ciphertext that, when XORed with the ciphertexts i
“assigned” other members, yields i’s message mi. Once the
shuffle protocol has revealed the N shuffled message descrip-
tors, representing an N ×N matrix of bulk ciphertext “as-
signments,” group members send (in parallel) their assigned
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Figure 2: Illustration of bulk protocol operation for 3-member group, shuffled using permutation π = [2, 3, 1].
ciphertexts to the designated target, enabling the target to
recover and verify all members’ messages. If any member
produces an incorrect bulk ciphertext, a blame phase reruns
the shuffle protocol, enabling the anonymous sender of the
corrupted message to “accuse” and expose the culprit.
2.5 Simplifying Assumptions
Our core protocol descriptions in Sections 3 and 4 make
several simplifying assumptions, which we will relax and ad-
dress more realistically later in Section 5. We assume for
now that: (a) all members know when to initiate a protocol
run and how to distinguish one run from another; (b) all
members of a group participate in every protocol run; (c)
all members have public encryption keys and nonrepudiable
signing keys known to all other members; and (d) all mem-
bers remain connected throughout a protocol run and never
stop sending correctly-signed messages, until the protocol
run has completed from the perspective of all group mem-
bers. Assumption (d) implies that we address only safety
properties for now, deferring liveness issues to Section 5—
including the important corner case of a node withholding
the last message it is supposed to send while collecting all
other members’ final messages, learning a protocol run’s re-
sults while denying others those results.
3. SHUFFLE PROTOCOL
This section details the shuffle protocol, first covering its
cryptographic building blocks, then formally describing pro-
tocol, proving its correctness, and analyzing its complexity.
3.1 Cryptographic Primitives
We use a standard, possibly randomized signature scheme
consisting of: (a) a key generation algorithm producing a
private/public key pair (u, v); (b) a signing algorithm tak-
ing private key u and message m to produce signature σ =
sigu{m}; and (c) a deterministic verification algorithm tak-
ing public key v, message m, and candidate signature σ, and
returning true iff σ is a correct signature of m using v’s as-
sociated private key u. The notation {m}sigu indicates the
concatenation of message m with the signature sigu{m}.
We also require a public-key cryptosystem, which must be
IND-CCA2 secure [2] (e.g., RSA-OAEP [16]). The cryp-
tosystem consists of: (a) a key generation algorithm pro-
ducing a private/public key pair (x, y); (b) an encryption
algorithm taking public key y, plaintext m, and some ran-
dom bits R, and producing a ciphertext C = {m}Ry ; (c) a
deterministic decryption algorithm taking private key x and
ciphertext C, and returning the plaintext m. We assume
a node can save the random bits R it uses during encryp-
tion, and that it can encrypt deterministically using a given
R, such that given inputs y, m, and R always yield the
same ciphertext. Software cryptosystems using pseudoran-
dom number generators generally satisfy this assumption.
The notation C = {m}R1:RNy1:yN indicates iterated encryption
via multiple keys: C = {. . . {m}R1y1 . . . }
RN
yN . We omit R when
an encryption’s random inputs need not be saved.
We use the standard definition [31] of an unkeyed hash
function and will denote the hash of messagem as hash{m}.
We use a standard definition [31] of a pseudo-random bit
generator. We will denote the first L bits generated from a
pseudo-random bit generator seeded with s as prf{L, s}.
3.2 Formal Protocol Description
Each member i (for i = 1, . . . , N) has a primary encryp-
tion key pair (xi, yi), a signing key pair (ui, vi), and a secret
datum di of fixed length L to send anonymously.
Before a protocol run, all members agree on a session
nonce nR uniquely identifying this protocol run, the par-
ticipants’ primary public encryption and signing keys, and a
common ordering of all members 1, . . . , N . Such agreement
might be achieved via Paxos [21] or BFT [6].
The shuffle protocol operates in phases; each member i
sends at most one message miφ per phase φ, though i may
broadcast the same miφ to several members. Each member
maintains a tamper-evident log of all messages it sends and
receives in a protocol run [19]. Member i signs each miφ it
sends with its private key ui, and includes in each message
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the session nonce nR and a hash hφ of i’s current log head in
phase φ. Each hφ depends on all messages i received up to
phase φ before sending miφ. Members ignore any messages
they receive containing a bad signature or session nonce.
• Phase 1: Secondary Key Pair Generation. Each member
i chooses an encryption key pair (wi, zi), and broadcasts:
{zi, nR, h1}sigui
• Phase 2: Data submission. Each member i encrypts her
datum di with all members’ secondary public keys:
C′i = {di}zN :z1
Member i stores C′i for later use, then further encrypts
C′i with all members’ primary public keys, this time in-
ternally saving the random bits used in each encryption:
Ci = {C
′
i}
RiN :Ri1
yN :y1
Member i now sends to member 1:
{Ci, nR, h2}sigui
• Phase 3: Anonymization. Member 1 collects all cipher-
texts into a vector ~C0 = C1, . . . , CN , randomly permutes
its elements, then strips one layer of encryption from each
ciphertext using private key x1 to form ~C1. Member 1
sends to member 2:
{ ~C1, nR, h3}sigui
Each member 1 < i < N in turn accepts ~Ci−1, permutes
it, strips one encryption layer to form ~Ci, then sends ~Ci to
member i+ 1. Member N finally permutes and decrypts
~CN−1 to form ~CN , and broadcasts to all members:
{ ~CN , nR, h3}sigui
If any member i detects a duplicate or invalid cipher-
text during this phase, member i reports it and the group
moves directly to phase 5b below (“blame”).
• Phase 4: Verification. All members now hold ~CN , which
should be a permutation of C′1, . . . , C
′
N . Each member i
verifies that her own C′i is included in ~CN , sets a flag goi
to true if so and false otherwise, and broadcasts:
{goi,hash{ ~CN}, nR, h4}sigui
Each member i then waits for such a “go/no-go” message
from all other members. If every member j reports goj =
true for the correct hash{ ~CN}, then member i enters
phase 5a below; otherwise i enters phase 5b.
• Phase 5a: Decryption. Each member i destroys her copy
of C′i and the random bits she saved in phase 2, then
broadcasts her secondary private key wi to all members:
{wi, nR, h5}sigui
Upon receiving all keys w1, . . . , wN , member i checks that
each wj is the private key corresponding to public key zj ,
going to phase 5b if not. Member i then removes the
remaining N levels of encryption from ~CN , resulting in a
permutation of the submitted data d1, . . . , dN .
• Phase 5b: Blame. Each member first destroys her sec-
ondary private key wi, then reveals to all members the
random bits Rij she saved from the primary public key
encryptions in phase 2, and all signed messages she re-
ceived and sent in phases 1–4. Each member i uses this
information to check the behavior of each member j in
phases 1–4, replaying j’s primary key encryptions in phase
2 and verifying that j’s anonymized output ~Cj in phase 3
was a decrypted permutation of ~Cj−1. Member i exposes
member j as faulty if j signed an invalid zj in phase 1,
an incorrectly encrypted Cj in phase 2, an improperly de-
crypted or permuted ~Cj in phase 3, a goj = false or a
wrong hash{ ~CN} in phase 4 after phases 1–3 succeeded,
an incorrect wj in phase 5a; or if j equivocated by signing
more than one message or log head hφ in any phase φ.
3.3 Proofs of Correctness
The shuffle protocol’s integrity and anonymity derive al-
most directly from Brickell/Shmatikov [5], so we only sketch
proofs of these properties, focusing instead on the account-
ability property introduced by our enhancements.
3.3.1 Integrity
To preserve integrity, after a protocol run every honest
member must either: (a) hold the datum di of every honest
member i, or (b) know that the protocol did not complete
successfully. Suppose that a protocol run appears to com-
plete successfully via phase 5a (decryption), but some honest
member i does not hold the plaintext dj of some other hon-
est member j. Since j is honest, j’s intermediate ciphertext
C′j must be a correct encryption of dj , and C
′
j must have
appeared in ~CN , otherwise j would have sent goj = false
in phase 4. Since honest member i would not enter phase
5a without receiving goj = true for the same ~CN from
all members, member i must hold C′j , and C
′
j must decrypt
to dj if all members released correct secondary private keys
w1, . . . , wN during phase 5a. If some faulty member released
an incorrect key w′k 6= wk, all honest members see that w
′
k
does not match k’s public key zk and know that k is faulty.
3.3.2 Anonymity
The protocol preserves integrity if no group of k ≤ N − 2
colluding members can win an anonymity game, determin-
ing which of two honest members submitted which of two
plaintexts, with non-negligible probability [5]. The attacker
might gain advantage either by manipulating protocol mes-
sages, or by using only the information revealed by a correct
protocol run. In the first case, the attacker can identify the
intermediate ciphertext C′i of some honest member i by du-
plicating or eliminating other honest members’ ciphertexts
in phase 3, but any honest member will detect duplication
in stage 3 and elimination in stage 4, aborting the protocol
before the attacker can decryptC′i. In the second case, an at-
tacker who can win the anonymity game with non-negligible
probability, using only information revealed by correct pro-
tocol runs, can use this ability to win the distinguishing game
that defines an IND-CCA2 secure cryptosystem [2,5].
3.3.3 Accountability
Amember i exposes another member j in phase 5b (blame)
if i obtains proof of j’s misbehavior verifiable by a third
party. To maintain accountability, no member may expose
an honest member, and at the end of a protocol run, ei-
ther: (a) the protocol completes successfully, or (b) all hon-
est members expose at least one faulty member.
We first show that no member i can expose an honest
member j. A proof of misbehavior by j consists of some
“incriminating”messagemjφ signed by j in phase φ, together
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with all of the messages in j’s log up through phase φ, and
the random bits each node saved during phase 2 and released
in phase 5b. Member i could “truthfully” expose j only if
j signs an incorrect message in phases 1–5a, or signs more
than one message per phase, contradicting the assumption
that j is honest. Member i could also falsely accuse j by
exhibiting one of j’s messages mjφ, together with a false
“prior” message m′kφ′ (for φ
′ < φ) signed by some colluding
node k, different from the message mkφ′ that j actually used
to compute her message mjφ. In this case, the “proof” will
contain bothmkφ′ (from j’s log) and the falsem
′
kφ′ , exposing
the equivocating member k instead of honest member j.
Now suppose a protocol run fails, but some honest mem-
ber i does not expose any faulty member in the blame phase.
Member i enters the blame phase only if it: (a) detects a
faulty encryption key in phase 1, (b) detects a duplicate or
faulty ciphertext in phase 3, (c) sees a goj = false in phase
4, (d) sees an incorrect hash{ ~CN} in phase 4, (e) detects a
bad secondary private key in phase 5a. Cases (a) and (e)
immediately expose the relevant message’s sender as faulty.
In case (b), member i can encounter a duplicate ciphertext
in phase 3 only if some member 1 ≤ j < i injected it earlier
in the anonymization phase, or if two members j1 and j2 col-
luded to inject it in phase 2. (Two independently encrypted
ciphertexts are cryptographically unique due to the random
bits used in encryption.) If some member 1 ≤ j < i dupli-
cated a ciphertext, then using the message logs of members
1 through i and the random bits from phase 2, member i
can replay the decryptions and permutations of each mem-
ber before i in phase 3 to expose j as faulty. If no member
duplicated a ciphertext in phase 3, then in replaying phase
3, i finds the senders of the ciphertexts Cj1 and Cj2 decrypt-
ing to identical ciphertexts in ~Ci−1, exposing j1 and j2. If
i cannot decrypt a ciphertext in phase 3, it similarly traces
the bad ciphertext to the member responsible.
In case (c) above, either the sender j of the goj = false
truthfully reported its ciphertext missing in phase 4, or sent
goj = false although its intermediate ciphertext C
′
j ap-
peared in ~CN . In the former case, i replays phase 3 to ex-
pose the member who replaced j’s ciphertext. In the latter
case, the occurrance of C′j in ~CN exposes j itself.
In case (d), member i’s ~CN does not match the hash{ ~C
′
N}
in another member j’s go/no-go ( ~CN 6= ~C
′
N ). Members i and
j compare message logs, revealing that either i or j is lying
about the message member N sent in phase 3, or member
N sent two signed messages in phase 3, exposing i, j, or N .
3.4 Complexity
If the underlying network provides efficient broadcast, then
each node transmits O(NL) bits, for a total communication
cost of O(N2L). Without efficient broadcast, the “normal-
case” phases 1 through 5a still require each node to transmit
only O(NL) bits, for O(N2L) overall cost, because all broad-
casts in these phases are either single messages of length
O(NL) or N messages of length O(L). The blame phase in
an unsuccessful run may require O(N3L) total communica-
tion for all honest members to expose some faulty member,
but an attacker can trigger at most O(N) such runs before
the group exposes and removes all faulty members.
Protocol latency is dominated by the N serial commu-
nication rounds in phase 3, in which each node must send
O(NL) bits, for a total latency of O(N2L) transmission bit-
times. Other phases require a constant number of unicast
messages or parallelizable broadcasts.
Excluding the blame phase, each member’s computational
cost is dominated by the 2N encryptions it must perform in
phase 2, each processing plaintexts of length O(L+N) due
to plaintext expansion during iterated encryption, for an
overall cost of O(N2+NL) per node or O(N3+N2L) total.
The blame phase introduces an additional O(N) factor if all
members must replay all other members’ encryptions.
4. BULK PROTOCOL
We now describe Dissent’s bulk protocol formally, prove
its correctness and security, and analyze its complexity.
4.1 Formal Description
Members 1, . . . , N initially hold messagesm1, . . . ,mN , now
of varying lengths L1, . . . , LN . As before, each member i has
a signing key pair (ui, vi) and a primary encryption key pair
(xi, yi); all members know each others’ public keys, and have
agreed on session identifier nR and an ordering of members.
• Phase 1: Message Descriptor Generation. Each member
i chooses a random seed sij for each member j, then for
each j 6= i, computes the first Li bits of a pseudo-random
function seeded with each sij to obtain ciphertext Cij :
Cij = prf{Li, sij} (j 6= i)
Member i now XORs her message mi with each Cij for
j 6= i to obtain ciphertext Cii:
Cii = Ci1 ⊕ . . .⊕ Ci(i−1) ⊕mi ⊕ Ci(i+1) ⊕ . . .⊕CiN
Member i computes Hij = hash{Cij}, encrypts seed sij
with j’s public key to form Sij = {sij}
Rij
yj , and collects
the Hij and Sij for each j into vectors ~Hi and ~Si:
~Hi = Hi1, . . . ,HiN
~Si = Si1, . . . , SiN
Finally, member i forms a message descriptor di:
di = {Li,hash{mi}, ~Hi, ~Si}
• Phase 2: Message Descriptor Shuffle. The group runs the
shuffle protocol in Section 3, each member i submitting
its fixed-length descriptor di. The shuffle protocol broad-
casts all descriptors in some random permutation π to all
members, so di appears at position π(i) in the shuffle.
• Phase 3: Data transmission. Each member j now recog-
nizes his own descriptor dj in the shuffle, and sets C
′
jj =
Cjj . From all other descriptors di (i 6= j), j decrypts Sij
with private key xj to reveal seed sij , computes ciphertext
Cij = prf{Li, sij}, and checks hash{Cij} against Hij . If
decryption succeeds and the hashes match, member j sets
C′ij = Cij . If decryption of Sij fails or hash{Cij} 6= Hij ,
then j sets C′ij to an empty ciphertext, C
′
ij = {}.
Member j now signs and sends each C′ij to the designated
target for the protocol run, in π-shuffled order:
{C′
pi−1(1)j , . . . , C
′
pi−1(N)j , nR, h3}siguj .
• Phase 4: Message Recovery. The designated target (or
each member if the target is the whole group) checks each
C′ij it receives from member j against the correspond-
ing Hij from message descriptor di. If C
′
ij is empty or
hash{C′ij} 6= Hij , then message slot π(i) was corrupted
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and the target ignores it. For each uncorrupted slot π(i),
the target recovers i’s message by computing:
mi = C
′
i1 ⊕ ...⊕ C
′
iN
• Phase 5: Blame. If any messages were corrupted in phase
4, all members run the shuffle protocol again, in which
each member i whose message was corrupted anonymously
broadcasts an accusation naming the culprit member j:
Ai = {j, Sij , sij , Rij}
Each accusation contains the seed sij that i assigned j and
the random bits i used to encrypt the seed. Each mem-
ber k verifies the revealed seed by replaying its encryption
Sij = {sij}
Rij
yj , and checks thatHij = hash{prf{Li, sij}};
if the accusation is valid, then each k exposes j as faulty.
If the shuffle reveals no valid accusation for a corrupted
message slot π(i), then k does nothing: either the anony-
mous sender i has corrupted his own message or has cho-
sen not to accuse the member who did, which is essentially
equivalent to i sending a valid but useless message.
4.2 Proofs of Correctness
We now show that the bulk protocol provides integrity,
anonymity, and accountability as defined in Section 2.3.
4.2.1 Integrity
The shuffle protocol ensures that the message descriptor
di of each honest member i is correctly included in the shuf-
fled output. The target can then use either the individual
ciphertext hashes Hij or the cleartext hash hash{mi} from
di to verify the integrity of i’s message in the bulk output.
The cleartext hash hash{mi} is technically redundant, but
it enables all members to verify the final results if only one
node collects and combines the ciphertexts for efficiency.
4.2.2 Anonymity
Suppose an attacker controls all but two honest members
i and j, and wishes to win the anonymity game [5] by deter-
mining with non-negligible advantage over random guessing
which honest member sent one of their plaintexts, say mi.
The attacker knows which two message slots π(i) and π(j)
belong to the honest members, and must find the exact per-
mutation π. Since the shuffle protocol preserves anonymity
(Section 3.3.2) and the shuffled message descriptors depend
only on random bits and the messages themselves, the at-
tacker learns nothing about π from the message descriptors.
The only other information the attacker obtains about mi
are the ciphertexts C′ik produced by all members k. But
since each bit of C′ii and C
′
ij is encrypted with a pseudo-
random one-time pad generated from a seed sij that only i
and j know, the attacker learns nothing from these bits.
4.2.3 Accountability
Suppose the bulk protocol violates accountability, imply-
ing that at the end of a protocol run, there is some honest
member j who does not hold the plaintext of another hon-
est member i and does not expose any dishonest member.
Since the shuffle protocol maintains accountability, member
j must have received i’s message descriptor di. Since i is
honest, di contains correctly computed hashes Hik and cor-
rectly encrypted seeds Sik for ciphertexts C
′
ik that, XORed
together, would reveal i’s message mi to j. Some member k
must therefore have sent an incorrect ciphertext in the bulk
phase. But since i is honest, i would have sent a correct
accusation of k in the blame phase, exposing k as faulty.
4.3 Complexity
With efficient broadcast, in the normal case each mem-
ber transmits O(N2) bits to shuffle N message descriptors
of length O(N), then sends Ltot + O(1) bits in the data
transmission phase, where Ltot =
∑
i
Li. Normal-case com-
munication complexity is thus O(N2) + Ltot bits per node.
An unsuccessful run may transmit O(N3) + Ltot bits per
node due to the shuffle protocol’s blame phase.
If N is small so that message length Ltot dominates, if
only one member wishes to transmit (Li = Ltot and Lj = 0
for j 6= i), and the transmitted data is incompressible, then
Dissent’s communication efficiency is asymptotically opti-
mal for our attack model: any member sending o(Ltot) bits
cannot be the sender, a trivial traffic analysis vulnerability.
The shuffle protocol incurs an O(N3) startup latency, as
the N nodes serially shuffle N descriptors of length O(N),
but the data transmission phase is fully parallelizable, for a
total latency of O(N3 + Ltot) transmission bit-times.
Each member i performs N cryptographic operations on
O(N) bits each during the shuffle, N operations on Li bits
to compute Cii, and one operation on Lj bits to compute
Cij for each j 6= i. The protocol’s computational complexity
is thus O(N2 +NLtot) per node.
5. USAGE CONSIDERATIONS
In describing Dissent’s shuffle and bulk protocols, we made
a number of simplifying assumptions, which we now address
by placing these core protocols in the context of a more re-
alistic, high-level “wrapper” protocol. We merely sketch this
wrapper protocol without formal definition or analysis, since
it is intended only to illustrate one way to deploy Dissent
in a realistic environment, and not to define the “right” way
to do so. The wrapper protocol addresses five practical is-
sues: protocol initiation, member selection, deniable keying,
liveness assurance, and end-to-end reliability.
5.1 Protocol Initiation
Our shuffle and bulk protocols assume that all group mem-
bers “just know” when to commence a protocol run, but in
practice some node must initiate each run. Members must
not initiate a protocol run out of a desire to send anony-
mously, however, since doing so would make the sender’s
identity obvious to traffic analysis.
In our wrapper protocol, therefore, each protocol run is
unilaterally initiated by some node, whom we call the leader.
To enable members to send “spontaneously” without com-
promising their anonymity, every group member periodi-
cally initiates a protocol run independently of its own de-
sire to send, on either a fixed or randomized time schedule.
(Anonymity would be equally well served if the leader was
the same for all protocol runs, but requiring every mem-
ber to act as leader occasionally makes it easier to address
liveness issues discussed below.) If group policy permits, a
non-anonymous outsider may also lead a protocol run, ef-
fectively invoking the collective services of the group as in
anonymous data-mining applications [5].
5.2 Selecting Available Participants
The core protocols above assume that every group mem-
ber participates in a given protocol run, but in practice at
7
least a few members of a long-lived group are likely to be
unavailable at any given time, making it pragmatically im-
portant for the group to be able to make progress in the
absence of a few members. The wrapper protocol there-
fore distinguishes a group’s long-term membership M from
the set of members MR participating in a particular run R,
where MR ⊆M . In the wrapper protocol, the leader of run
R is responsible for detecting which members are presently
available and bringing those available to a consensus on the
precise set of participants MR for run R.
A key issue in choosing MR is preventing a malicious
leader from packing MR with colluding members to the
exclusion of most honest members, limiting the anonymity
of the few honest members remaining. Group policy must
therefore define some minimum quorum Q, and honest nodes
refuse to participate in any proposed protocol run where
|MR| < Q. If there are at most f ≤ Q − 2 faulty nodes,
therefore, then honest nodes are always guaranteed at least
(Q− f)-anonymity regardless of how MR is chosen.
As a further defense, honest members might actively pro-
tect each other against malicious exclusion as follows. If
honest member i receives a proposal from would-be leader
lR to initiate run R while excluding some other member j,
but i believes j to reachable, then i demands that lR add j to
MR—forwarding messages between lR and j if necessary—as
a precondition on i participating in round R at all.
5.3 Coercion Resistance via Deniable Keying
Dissent’s shuffle protocol assumes each group member i
has and a signing key pair (ui, vi) with which it signs all mes-
sages, creating the nonrepudiable “accountability trail” that
the blame phase (5b) requires to trace a misbehaving mem-
ber. Unfortunately, this nonrepudiable record could also en-
able members to prove to a third party which message they
sent (or didn’t send) in a given protocol run. In anonymous
communication scenarios we often desire not just anonymity
but also repudiability [4]: after a protocol run, no one should
be able to prove to a third party which message any mem-
ber sent, or ideally, whether a member participated at all. In
anonymous voting applications, we often desire the closely
related property of resistance to coercion or “vote-buying.”
Our wrapper protocol can provide a form of repudiabil-
ity or coercion resistance as follows. We assume each group
member i’s well-known identity is defined only by its pri-
mary encryption key pair (xi, yi), and members now choose
a fresh, temporary signing key pair (ui, vi) for each protocol
run. To initiate a run, the would-be leader l uses a deniable
authenticated key exchange algorithm such as SKEME [24]
to form a secure channel with each potential participant i,
using l’s and i’s primary encryption keys for authentication.
Each member i uses this pairwise-authenticated channel to
send the leader i’s fresh public signing key vi for the run.
Once l forms a tentative list of N = |MR| participants,
l broadcasts to all participants a round descriptor DR con-
taining a timestamp, all participants’ primary public keys
y1, . . . , yN , and all participants’ corresponding temporary
signing keys v1, . . . , vN for the run. Each member i now
forms a challenge cij for each node j, containing a random
nonce Nij and a hash of DR keyed on Nij . Member i then
encrypts cij with j’s public key yj to yield Cij . Member i
sends its encrypted challenges to the leader, who forwards
each Cij to member j. Member j decrypts Cij , verifies the
keyed hash it contains against the DR that j received from
the leader, and returns cij to the leader, who forwards it to
i. On a decryption failure or challenge mismatch, the leader
must decide whether to exclude i or j from a retry attempt;
i can prove its innocence by revealing the random bits it
used to encrypt its original challenge to j.
Once all members confirmDR with all other members, the
shuffle protocol proceeds using the temporary signing keys in
DR. These signing keys provide nonrepudiation only within
the protocol run, allowing the leader to trace misbehaving
members and exclude them from subsequent runs. No node
is left with proof that any member i actually used signing key
yi during a given run, however, since anyone can unilaterally
forge all the authenticated key exchanges, challenges, and
subsequent messages in the shuffle and bulk protocols.
Of course, this form of repudiability is useful only against
an attacker who actually requires third-party verifiable“proof
of responsibility” in order to coerce group members. If the
attacker can see all network traffic, as our attack model as-
sumes, and the attacker’s traffic logs alone constitute“proof”
of which network packets a given member sent, then we know
of no way to achieve deniability or coercion resistance. Sim-
ilarly, a member might be coerced before a protocol run into
sending some sufficiently unique, attacker-supplied message
or ballot; if the mere appearance of that message/ballot
in the run’s output satisfies the attacker that the mem-
ber “stayed bought,” then no anonymity mechanism based
purely on a random shuffle will address this form of coercion.
5.4 Ensuring Liveness
As we have seen, tracing active disruptors of the shuffle or
bulk protocols presents particular technical challenges due
to the need to protect the anonymity of honest senders. A
member might passively disrupt either protocol, however, by
simply going offline at any time, either intentionally or due
to node or network failure. Fortunately, given the core pro-
tocols’ resistance to both active disruption and traffic anal-
ysis, we can ensure liveness and handle passive disruption
via more generic techniques.
Each phase of the shuffle and bulk protocols demand that
particular members send properly signed messages to other
members. Again borrowing terminology and ideas from Peer-
Review [19], when the protocol demands that member i send
member j a message, and member j has not received such
a (properly signed) message for some time, we say that j
suspects i. Once j suspects i, j informs another node k (the
leader, for example) of j’s suspicion; k in turn contacts i
demanding a (signed) copy of i’s message to j. If i fails to
offer this message to k, then after some time k suspects j as
well and notifies other members in turn, eventually causing
all honest, connected members to suspect i. Member i can
dispel any honest member’s suspicion at any time by offer-
ing a copy of the demanded message. If i honestly cannot
send to j due to asymmetric connectivity, for example, then
i responds to k’s demand with the required message, which
k forwards back to j, dispelling both j’s and k’s suspicion
and enabling the protocol to proceed.
Since our wrapper protocol makes the leader responsible
for initiating protocol runs, we also make it the leader’s re-
sponsibility to decide when a protocol run has failed due
to a suspected node going offline—or deliberately withhold-
ing a required message—for too long. At this point, the
leader starts a new protocol run, excluding any exposed or
persistently suspected nodes from the previous run, and the
8
remaining members attempt to resend their messages. If the
leader fails, members can retry their sends in a future run
initiated by a different leader.
5.5 End-to-End Reliability
A corner-case liveness challenge for most protocols is clo-
sure, or determining when participants may consider the
protocol “successfully concluded.” In a byzantine model,
a malicious member might intentionally withhold the last
message he was supposed to send—e.g., his own secondary
private key in phase 5a of the shuffle protocol, or his own ci-
phertext in the bulk protocol—while collecting the last mes-
sages of other members, thereby learning the results of the
protocol run while denying those results to other members.
We approach this class of problems in general by treating
our shuffle and bulk protocols as a “best-effort” anonymous
delivery substrate, atop which some higher-level protocol
must provide end-to-end reliable delivery and graceful clo-
sure if desired. If a faulty member denies other members
a protocol run’s results, the honest members will soon sus-
pect the faulty member, and the same or a different leader
will eventually start a new protocol run without the faulty
member, in which the members may retransmit their mes-
sages. If a member i wishes to ensure that a message he
sends anonymously is reliably seen by a particular member
j, i must resend the message in successive protocol runs
until j acknowledges the message. (Member j might sign
acknowledgments via either a public or pseudonymous key).
If the messages sent in a protocol run are interrelated,
such as the ballots comprising an anonymous vote, and the
group wishes to ensure that some quorum of members see
the result, then the group can follow the voting run with
an acknowledgment run, discarding and repeating unsuc-
cessful votes (with successively smaller membership sets if
members go offline) until the required number of members
acknowledge the results. If the group wishes to provide reli-
able broadcast semantics or maintain some consistent group
state across successive protocol runs, the group can imple-
ment byzantine consensus [6] atop the shuffled send primi-
tive, ensuring both liveness and strong consistency as long
as over two thirds of the group members remain live.
6. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
To evaluate Dissent’s practicality, we built and tested a
simple prototype of the protocol. The prototype is written in
Python, using OpenSSL’s implementations of 1024-bit RSA-
OAEP with AES-256 for public-key encryption and signing,
AES-256 in counter mode as the bulk protocol’s pseudo-
random function, and SHA-1 as the hash algorithm.
We used the Emulab [15] network testbed to test the pro-
totype under controlled network conditions. We ran the
prototype on recent x86 PCs machines running Ubuntu 7.04
and Python 2.5, on a simulated star topology in which every
node is connected to a central switch via a 5Mbps connec-
tion with a latency of 50ms (100 ms node-to-node latency).
We make no claim that this topology is “representative” of
likely deployment scenarios for Dissent, since we know of no
data on the network properties “typical” online groups that
might wish to run Dissent. Our simulated topology is merely
intended to reflect plausible communication bandwidths and
delays for wide-area Internet communication.
We rely on the formal analysis in previous sections to eval-
uate Dissent’s security properties, and assume that the ac-
countability measures in a full implementation of Dissent
will deter or eventually exclude misbehaving members. For
experimentation purposes, therefore, we implement and test
only the “normal-case” aspects of the protocol in the current
prototype. The prototype does not use a secure public key
infrastructure, and does not implement the “blame” phases
or the wrapper protocol. Nodes sign and verify all mes-
sages, however, ensuring that performance measurements
accurately reflect Dissent’s normal-case costs.
The prototype uses TCP for communication, maintaining
TCP connections throughout a given protocol run to min-
imize startup overhead, but closing all connections at the
end of each run. Where Dissent requires broadcast, nodes
implement these broadcasts atop TCP by sending their mes-
sages to a leader, who bundles all broadcasts for that phase
and sends each node a copy of the bundle.
6.1 Performance Evaluation
Figure 3 shows the total time the prototype requires to
broadcast messages of varying sizes anonymously among 16
nodes, using either the shuffle protocol alone or the full Dis-
sent protocol. In each case, we test two message loads: a
Balanced load in which each node sends 1/16th of the to-
tal message data, and a OneSender load in which one node
sends all the data and other nodes send nothing.
For a single node to send a 16MB message, Dissent runs
in about 31 minutes, or 3.6× longer than one node requires
to broadcast the same data to the other 15 nodes with no
encryption or anonymization. While significant, we feel this
is a reasonable price to pay for strong anonymity.
As expected, the full protocol incurs a higher startup de-
lay than the shuffle protocol alone, but handles unbalanced
loads more gracefully, maintaining similar performance for a
given total message length regardless of balance. We are not
aware of any other verifiable shuffles [17,22] for which work-
ing implementations and performance data are available, but
given their typical assumption of small, equal-length mes-
sages, we expect their performance on unbalanced loads to
be at best on par with our shuffle protocol alone.
Figure 4 breaks the runtime of the full Dissent protocol
into its shuffle and bulk protocol components, illustrating
that the shuffle’s cost remains constant with message size
and becomes negligible as total message length grows.
The full Dissent protocol still shows some slowdown un-
der highly unbalanced load: although balance does not af-
fect Dissent’s communication cost, it does affect computa-
tion costs. When only one node is sending, that node must
compute and XOR together N − 1 pseudo-random streams
of message length L, while other nodes each compute only
one L-byte stream. This timing difference could lead to a
side-channel attack if not handled carefully in implementa-
tion, e.g., by pre-computing all required bit strings before
commencing a send. We have made no attempt to analyze
the protocol in detail for side-channel attacks, however.
Figure 5 measures the prototype’s runtime with varying
group sizes. In a successful run, each node sends O(N2) bits
in the shuffle and Ltot +O(1) bits in the bulk protocol. As
expected, the shuffle’s runtime increases much more quickly
with N than the bulk protocol, although the superlinear N2
curve manifests only slightly for the small groups we tested.
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Figure 3: Time required for anonymous broadcast
of balanced and unbalanced message loads among
16 nodes, via shuffle alone or full Dissent protocol.
Figure 4: Time required to send varying message
sizes, broken into shuffle and bulk transfer protocol
portions.
7. RELATED WORK
Dissent’s shuffle protocol builds directly on Brickell and
Shmatikov’s data collection protocol [5], adding DoS resis-
tance via our new go/no-go and blame phases. Dissent’s
bulk protocol is similarly inspired by DC-nets [8], which
are a computationally efficient and provide unconditional
anonymity, but traditionally require nondeterministic“reser-
vation” schemes to allocate the anonymous channel’s com-
munication bandwidth, and are difficult to protect against
anonymous DoS attacks by group members. Strategies ex-
ist to strengthen DC-nets against DoS attacks [36], or to
form new groups when an attack is detected [28]. Dissent’s
use of a shuffle protocol to set up a deterministic DC-nets
instance, however, cleanly avoids these DoS vulnerabilities
while providing the additional guarantee that each member
sends exactly one message per protocol run, a useful prop-
erty for holding votes or assigning 1-to-1 pseudonyms.
Mix-networks [7] provide scalable and practical anony-
mous unicast communication, and can be adapted to group
broadcast [23]. Unfortunately, mix-networks are difficult to
protect against traffic analysis [27] and DoS attacks [13,20],
and in fact lose security under DoS attack [3]. Crowds [25]
are more computationally efficient that mix networks, but
are vulnerable to statistical traffic analysis when an attacker
can monitor many points across the network. Dissent in con-
trast is provably secure against traffic analysis.
Anonymous voting protocols solve a problem that closely
relates to the group broadcast problem. Each user casts a
Figure 5: Time required to send 1MB of data (bal-
anced) using shuffle and bulk transfer protocols to-
gether with a varying group size.
ballot whose contents should be publicly known but whose
author should be unknown to both the election officials and
other voters. Many voting protocols allow transmission of
only fixed-length “Yes” or “No” messages [1].
Cryptographically verifiable shuffles [17,22] might be used
in place of our shuffle protocol, allowing shuffles to be per-
formed and verified offline. These algorithms require more
complex calculations, however. Further, guaranteeing not
only a shuffle’s correctness, but also its randomness and
hence anonymity in the presence of compromised members,
still requires passing a batch of messages through a series of
independent shuffles, as in Dissent or mix-networks [12].
Other relevant schemes for group-oriented anonymity in-
clude ring signatures [26], which provide no protection against
traffic analysis, and k-anonymous message transmission pro-
tocols [35], which provide anonymity only when a large frac-
tion of group members are honest.
Tor [11] and Herbivore [28] are two well-known practi-
cal systems for providing anonymous communication over
the Internet. These systems scale to far larger groups than
Dissent does, and also permit interactive communication.
These systems do not provide Dissent’s strong guarantees
of anonymity or accountability, however. As a system based
on mix networks, Tor is vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks.
Herbivore provides unconditional anonymity, but only within
a small subgroup of the total group of participants. Dissent
may be more suitable for non-interactive communication
between participants willing to sacrifice protocol execution
speed for strong assurances of anonymity and accountability.
8. CONCLUSION
Dissent is a novel protocol for anonymous and accountable
group communication. Dissent allows a well-known group of
participants to anonymously exchange variable-length mes-
sages without the risks of traffic analysis or anonymous DoS
attacks associated with mix-networks and DC-nets. Dissent
improves upon previous shuffled-send primitives by adding
accountability – the ability to trace faulty nodes – and by
eliminating the message padding requirements that limit
earlier schemes. We have reviewed the practical concerns
associated with a real-world deployment of Dissent, and we
have proposed possible solutions for each. Our implementa-
tion demonstrates that Dissent is a practicable protocol, at
least for a medium-sized group of participants.
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